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11 Introduction
One of the striking discrepancies between theory and reality in international
trade concerns trade intermediaries (TIs).1 Theory maintains the ﬁction
that producers sell directly across borders to consumers. But as Hanson and
Feenstra (2001: 1) have noted “...how goods are actually traded appears to
be more complicated.” While TIs simply do not exist in the pure theory of
international trade, they have played major roles in ancient, medieval (see
e.g. Greif, 1993) and modern world trade (see e.g. Jones, 1998). To this day,
trade intermediaries dominate the foreign trade of a number of countries (e.g.
Hong Kong) or account for the major part of trade in speciﬁc commodities
or products. In the 1990s, Japan’s nine general trading companies (sogo
shoshas) exported over 40% and imported over 70% of the country’s mer-
chandise (Jones 1998: 1). Wholesale and trading ﬁrms accounted for 28% of
Germany’s exports in 1993. Intermediated exports are unevenly distributed
by country of destination. Furthermore, intermediaries of a home country
trade intensively with some destination countries, but not with others. In
France, for example, TIs accounted for 70% of exports to Ethiopia, but for
only 3% of exports to Indonesia.
Intermediaries are an important institution in economic systems. They
match buyers and sellers indirectly. In the absence of intermediation there is
a substantial possibility of a non-match, as Baye and Cosimano (1990) have
shown. Consequently, a large number of markets are characterized by a high
share of intermediated, rather than directly exchanged goods or services,
e.g. ﬁnancial markets or real estate markets. A key distinction must be
drawn between intermediaries who work on a commission basis for buyers
and sellers (brokers) and intermediaries who trade on their own account
(traders).2 Brokers never actually own the goods. Hence, their economic
function is best described as contract intermediation. Traders, on the other
hand, own the goods at some point in time and also bear the risk associated
with trading. They are trade intermediaries in the true sense of the word
and the focus of this paper is on trade intermediation rather than contract
intermediation.3
1An intermediary can be deﬁned as “...an economic agent who purchases from suppliers
for resale or who helps sellers and buyers to meet and transact.” (Spulber, 1998: 3).
2See Hackett (1992) for a comparative formal analysis of the two types of intermediaries.
3Trading ﬁrms are probably the best known group within the trade intermediaries.
However, foreign trade can also be intermediated by wholesale ﬁrms, retail ﬁrms, or chains
of supermarkets. Furthermore, the dividing line between brokers and traders which is
clear-cut in theory often becomes blurred in reality. Intermediary ﬁrms frequently act as
brokers one day and as traders the next (Chalmin 1987: 37).
2In this paper, we examine why and when trade intermediaries are used as
agents for exporting to diﬀerent countries in both theoretical and empirical
terms. As the theory of foreign trade intermediation is still in its infancy, the
present paper serves a twofold purpose. First, it presents a model with trade
intermediation placed in a framework of intra-industry trade (monopolistic
competition). From the model we identify a variety of factors responsible for
the choice of direct versus intermediated trade which correspond nicely to
the themes raised in the TI literature in general. In particular we postulate
three hypotheses which emerge as key factors explaining the TI share in
a country’s exports to certain markets. Second, we test these predictions
econometrically by using a newly developed data set based on enterprise-
related French customs data.
Section 2 presents a standard intra-industry trade model adapted to in-
clude the possibility of trade intermediation. Predictions as to the intensity
with which intermediaries are used in exports to diﬀerent markets are derived
from this framework and discussed. In section 3 these predictions are tested
empirically. Section 4 concludes.
2 Determinants of Export Intermediation
International trade theory assumes that trade occurs directly between pro-
ducers and ﬁnal users. Firms in the home country produce a good, which
they export directly to consumers abroad (Hanson and Feenstra, 2001: 1).
Yet, intermediation theory (e.g. Spulber, 1998) argues that intermediaries
can gain advantages over direct exchange in a number of ways, especially by
pooling and diversifying risk, reducing transaction costs, and lowering costs
of matching and searching. The present paper incorporates and examines
this possibility of trade intermediation.
Our model builds on the intra-industry trade models pioneered by Krug-
man (1980), but replaces the usual iceberg costs assumption with trade cost
assumptions following Venables (1987) (transport costs are explicitly intro-
duced as marginal cost increases) and Venables (1994) (eﬀects of ﬁxed and
variable cost to trade). We start by reproducing the basic result of a wedge
between exporters and non-exporters which was ﬁrst presented by Venables
(1994). Then we incorporate indirect trade by allowing non-exporting ﬁrms
to pool part of the ﬁxed costs of exporting via a trade intermediary. Or
put diﬀerently, the trade intermediary has some technology of pooling the
industry speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of exporting. In the resulting equilibrium we ﬁnd
that there exist large direct exporters (not using the intermediary), smaller
indirect exporters (going via the intermediary) and small non-exporting ﬁrms
3(servicing the home market only). Further results are: ﬁrst, the higher the
ﬁxed cost of exporting, the higher the share of indirect trade in total trade
(the intermediary share); second, larger export markets feature a smaller
share of intermediated trade; and third, an increase in the variable (trans-
port) costs has no eﬀect on the intermediary share. As will be shown in
Section 3, these theoretical results are supported by our empirical ﬁndings.
The paper closest to ours is perhaps Yu (2002), who also uses the Krug-
man (1980) and Venables (1994) approach, but studies the issue of en-
trepreneurship. In Yu (2002) the additional ﬁxed costs of exporting to the
foreign market can only be carried by certain individuals in the economy,
i.e. each ﬁrm has to hire its own entrepreneurs. In contrast to the present
paper, however, the possibility to pool resources using intermediate trading
companies is explicitly ruled out.
2.1 A Simple Model
The starting point for the present model is Krugman’s (1980) application of
the Chamberlinian monopolistic competition approach – building on Spence
(1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) – to international trade.
It is assumed that the world consists of two symmetric countries. Firms of
both countries produce in the same industry; market conditions are described
by monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale in production and
diﬀerentiated goods. The industry has a large number of potential variants,
which enter symmetrically into demand. Variants at home and abroad are
diﬀerent. Consumers want to consume both home and foreign variants.
The utility function of the model is based on Krugman (1981); it reinter-
prets the original feature of two industries as a distinction into home and for-
eign products and applies the speciﬁc functional form from Krugman (1980)
to both product groups. As the two countries are completely identical, it is
suﬃcient to concentrate on the speciﬁcation of the home country. Foreign













where 0 < θ < 1 and cM,i∗ is consumption of the i∗th variant of imports
and cH,i is consumption of the ith variant of home products.4 In this set-up,
the imports (M) of one country equal the exports (Z∗) of the other country
and vice versa, i.e. an implicit balanced trade assumption is employed. NH
4See the discussion in Venables (1994) for an introduction to the consumer budgeting
procedure that underlies such a utility function.
4and NM deﬁne large numbers of potential variants in both home and for-
eign products. The number of variants actually produced, nH and nM, are
assumed to be large, although smaller than NH and NM. Maximisation of
(1) yields that consumers spend equal shares of their income on imports and
home products. The indirect demand function, for example, for an import






On the supply side, it is assumed that there exists only one factor of
production, labour. Firms can produce their speciﬁc variant for the home
market, the foreign market or both. Following Venables (1987 and 1994) we
introduce both ﬁxed and variable trade costs. When supplying the foreign
market, the ﬁrm faces an additional variable cost t (e.g. costs of hiring
people to transport goods or to manage border formalities etc.). The ﬁxed









2 + g the subscripts h and z can be dropped.
Thus, g measures, for example, the cost of dealing with foreign red tape,
additional costs (risks) of enforcing legal contracts abroad, or extra costs
associated with setting up a distribution network abroad. When supplying
both markets, each ﬁrm produces with the same cost function given by:
li = f + g + βxH,i + (β + t)xZ,i (2)
where li is labour used in the production and distribution of the ith variant of
the home industry, xH,i is output of that variant for the home market and xZ,i
are the exports of that variant. This speciﬁcation includes β as a constant
marginal cost of production and hence average costs decline at a diminishing
rate. Each variant is produced by only one ﬁrm, and each ﬁrm produces only
one variant. Labour requirements (2) are converted into nominal costs by
multiplying them by the wage rate, w.
The market clearing condition demands that the output of each variant
should be equal to the total world consumption of that variant; more precisely
that the markets for imports and home goods have to clear. Assuming full
equality between the number of workers, L, and the number of consumers,
this gives xH,i = LcH,i and xZ,i = L∗c∗
M,i. Due to symmetry L = L∗ and
c∗
M,i = cM,i∗. Also, labour market clearing demands L = lin and L∗ = l∗
i∗n∗.
Since each variant behaves identically, subscripts i and i∗ are omitted in the
remainder of the paper.
Direct exports only (no intermediary)
Given constant ﬁxed and marginal costs the problem is split into two indepen-
dent maximisations for the home and foreign market. Denoting with ˇ the
5variables in a situation with no intermediary and bearing in mind that
p∗
M = pM = pZ = p∗
Z, i.e. consumer import (and ﬁrm export) prices are
identical in the two countries, we have the following proﬁt functions for the
home and foreign market respectively:











+ g + (β + t)ˇ xH

w (4)
The prices and quantities in each market and the resulting number of
ﬁrms can now be derived using the standard procedures; free entry and exit
of ﬁrms, the zero-proﬁt condition and labour and goods market clearing are
assumed (see e.g. Krugman 1980). The important characteristic of the trade
costs is that labour is actually used in the process. Firms employ workers
to carry out the transportation of goods, to deal with border formalities,
to set up a foreign distribution network, etc. Hence ﬁrms will supply their
output at a higher price to the foreign market. The workers engaged in the
jobs associated with the trade costs still get wage w, and will demand both
home and imported products – hence, total spending power, wL and w∗L∗,
are unchanged. However, some labour input is missing for the production of










, ˇ xZ =
(f + 2g)θ





, ˇ nZ =
(1 − θ)L
f + 2g
The number of ﬁrms is derived via the condition stemming from the max-
imisation of utility function (1) that consumers will use equal shares of their
income on imported goods and on home goods, i.e. ˇ pjˇ njˇ xj = wL
2 ,j = H,Z.
Comparing the resulting equilibrium (5) with the zero-trade-cost case (g =
t = 0) shows that the supply of home goods to the home market is un-
changed. Yet, for exports, prices have risen and quantities have fallen and
not all variants will be exported. Only some (large) ﬁrms choose to supply
both markets. Thus we have the result of small home-market-only ﬁrms and
larger export-and-home-market ﬁrms. Also, notice that when g rises, fewer
ﬁrms will export, but each exporting ﬁrm will be trading a larger quantity. In
addition, when the variable trade costs t rise, prices will rise and quantities
6will fall, but the number of exporting ﬁrms will remain unaﬀected. These
ﬁndings are parallel to the results of Venables (1994).5
Indirect exports only (with trade intermediation)
Consider now the possibility of trade intermediation. Assume that the export
costs g are industry speciﬁc, and that these industry speciﬁc ﬁxed costs g –
but not the ﬁrm speciﬁc market access costs fz or the transport costs t – can
be pooled among exporting ﬁrms. Thus, a trade intermediary operating on
the foreign market encounters the industry speciﬁc market access costs g
once but can spread them out among all ﬁrms that use his service.6 The
situation on the home market remains unaﬀected by the introduction of the
intermediary. However, the proﬁt function on the export market changes,
denoting variables in a situation with a trade intermediary by ˆ we have:







+ (β + t)ˆ xZ

w (6)
where ˆ nz is still determined endogenously in the model. Again evoking
free entry and exit and market clearing, the equilibrium can be derived,
whereby the equilibrium on the home market turns out as before. For the
export market however, by setting the proﬁt maximising prices, ˆ pZ =
(β+t)w
θ ,







ˆ nZ + (β + t)ˆ xZ

, the per







of ﬁrms can now be determined by the export market clearing condition
ˆ pZˆ n∗
Mˆ xZ = w∗L∗
2 , whereby ˆ n∗
M = ˆ nZ, and subsequently the actual value for
ˆ xZ can be calculated by setting the ˆ nZ just derived back into ˆ x0
Z. The re-










, ˆ xZ =
fθ
2(1 − θ)(β + t)
(1 − θ)L





, ˆ nZ =
(1 − θ)L − 2g
f
5Notice also that there is a clear welfare/utility loss associated with both forms of trade
costs.
6We are exploring other forms of modelling trade intermediaries, the competitive envi-
ronment they are operating in, and the resulting welfare eﬀects in a separate paper.
7Comparing the trade intermediation equilibrium in (7) with the equilibrium
without a trade intermediary (5) it is found that since the maximisation
problem on the home market is unaﬀected by the intermediary, the supply
of home goods to the home market, the home price and the number of home
ﬁrms is unchanged, i.e. ˇ pH = ˆ pH , ˇ xH = ˆ xH and ˇ nH = ˆ nH. Also on the
export markets prices are unaﬀected ˇ pZ = ˆ pZ. However, export quantities
per ﬁrm and the number of ﬁrms exporting have changed, namely ˇ xZ >
ˆ xZ and ˇ nZ < ˆ nZ. Thus with trade intermediation more home ﬁrms export
a smaller quantity each. Still not all ﬁrms will export and one still has the
result that there are larger ﬁrms supplying the home and foreign market and
smaller ﬁrms only supplying the home market. 7
Direct, indirect and total exports
Real world trade patters have the feature that some of the exports from or to
a certain country go through trade intermediaries (indirect exports) while
others are direct ﬁrm exports (direct exports). In order to develop an empir-
ically testable speciﬁcation, this feature must be incorporated into the model.
Let us assume that a fraction γ of all exporting ﬁrms, ne, trade through an
intermediary, while (1−γ)ne ﬁrms engage in direct exports.8 Then we know
from (5) and (7) that prices for both the direct and indirect exported goods
will be identical, ˇ pZ = ˆ pZ = pZ. However, the per ﬁrm trade volume will
diﬀer for direct and indirect exporters. In particular:
ˇ xZ =
(f + 2g)θ
2(1 − θ)(β + t)




2(1 − θ)(β + t)
(8)
Since on the home market nothing changes, the following ranking is implied
by (8): the equilibrium features large direct-exporting ﬁrms, medium size
indirect-exporting ﬁrms, and small home-market-only ﬁrms. Using the ex-
port market clearing condition, pZ (ˇ xZ(1 − γ)ne + ˆ xZγne) = w∗L∗
2 , and (8)
we can rewrite for γ:
γ =
2g + (2g + f)ne − L(1 − θ)
2gne
(9)
7Notice also that since the number of exported varieties increases, ˆ nZ > ˇ nZ, and the
total export volume, nZxZ, stays constant, the introduction of the trade intermediary
must be a welfare improvement (love of variety).
8From a total utility point of view, once the intermediary exists, then all ﬁrms should
use this service. However, if both direct and indirect exporters do exist at the same time,
then, since proﬁts for both groups are zero in equilibrium, any individual ﬁrm would be
indiﬀerent towards changing its status.
8In order to further examine how the intermediary share in the model is
determined one has to keep another variable constant. In the following we
will assume that the number of non-exporting ﬁrms, nn (i.e. products that
are only sold on the the home market), is ﬁxed at the level:
nn = λnH =
λL(1 − θ)
f




2g+f[}.9 This assumption may only be applicable
in the short run or – leaving the context of intra-industry trade – could be
motivated by some products being non-tradable. In any case, realising that
nn+ne = nH this assumption ties down the problem. Plugging the resulting
value of ne =
(1−λ)L(1−θ)
f into (9) gives:
γ
0 =
2g(f + L(1 − θ)(1 − λ)) − fL(1 − θ)λ
2gL(1 − θ)(1 − λ)










2(1 − θ)(β + t)
Finally, the total indirect export sales, ˆ XZ = ˆ x0
Zγ0(1−λ)nH, the total direct
export sales, ˇ XZ = ˇ xZ(1−γ0)(1−λ)nH, and the indirect export sales share,
S =
ˆ XZ
ˇ XZ+ ˆ XZ, i.e. the intermediary share, can be derived. In particular,
S =
L(1 − θ)((1 − λ)2g − fλ) + 2gf + 4g2
L(1 − θ)2g
. (10)
Notice that S measures the proportion of total exports that go through a
trade intermediary, while γ measures the share of exporting ﬁrms that use a
trade intermediary.
2.2 Predictions for the Intermediary Share in Exports
Given the share of intermediated trade in total exports, S, deﬁned in (10),
a number of testable predictions as to the nature of intermediary trade in a
country’s exports are derived. Hereby the comparative static results of the
exercise can be interpreted as the expected signs for diﬀerent export markets.
9These minimum and maximum values of λ constrain the problem to the number of
non-exporting ﬁrms implied by (7) and (5) respectively.




L(1−θ)2g2 > 0 while ∂S
∂t = 0. This intuitively compelling result means
that an increase in the industry and country speciﬁc market access costs leads
to more trade being conducted through intermediaries, while an increase (or
decrease) in the variable costs of trade (e.g. transport costs) has no eﬀect on
the share of intermediary exports. Examples of industry and country speciﬁc
market access costs could be costs of setting up a distribution network, costs
caused by instabilities in the legal environment, or other costs of enforcing
contracts abroad, etc. Parallel to this, one ﬁnds ∂S
∂f =
(1−θ)Lλ+2g
L(θ−1)2g < 0 indi-
cating that an increase in the ﬁrm speciﬁc market access costs (e.g. costs of
undergoing product certiﬁcation or marketing costs) lets more ﬁrms choose to




L2(θ−1) < 0, which indicates that smaller markets, lower L, are
more likely to be serviced via intermediaries. Hereby L must be interpreted
as market potential and thus might be reasonably approximated by the to-
tal (or rather average) exports from a certain country of origin to a certain
destination market. Finally, diﬀerentiating (10) with respect to the degree




L(θ−1)2 > 0, implying that if products are less diﬀerentiated
(larger θ), then more trade is conducted through intermediaries. This result
is intuitively compelling and supported by empirical insights (e.g. Rauch,
1999; Trabold, 2002) into the particularly important role of intermediaries
in the trade of less diﬀerentiated products.
In our view these theoretical ﬁndings lend support to three empirically
testable hypotheses on trade intermediation. Although other authors may
use slightly diﬀerent terminology, they frequently identify the market access
costs, size of export markets, and distance-dependent transaction costs as
reasons why indirect exchange oﬀers advantages over direct exchange. We
consider each of these factors in turn.
Market access costs
One result from our theoretical model is that ∂S
∂g > 0, i.e. an increase in
the industry speciﬁc market access costs allows more trade to be conducted
through intermediaries. This leads to our ﬁrst hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Other things being equal, the TI share in the exports of the
home country to a certain country of destination is higher the more diﬃcult
or costly it is to operate in the country of destination.
Market access costs for entering foreign markets come in many disguises:
red tape, costs of setting up a distribution network, risks related to con-
10tract enforcement, etc. Especially inter-temporal or long-distance transac-
tions carry the latter risk as they involve a promise to pay at one point in
time (or space) for goods received at some other point in time (or space) and
are therefore not self-enforcing. Both parties therefore run a substantial risk,
because local and international courts may be unwilling or unable to enforce
a contract signed between two parties from diﬀerent countries (Rodrik 2000).
As North (1990: 33) has pointed out, non-enforcement “...is (and always
has been) the critical obstacle to increasing specialization and the division
of labor.” It is exactly this type of cost to trading that is captured by the
ﬁxed costs to exporting, g, in our model. We will, therefore, use a variable
representing the legal environment of the destination country in our econo-
metric estimations. Notice also that empirical estimates of Anderson and
Marcouiller (2002) suggest that imperfect contract enforcement dramatically
reduces international trade per se.
Market size
A second result from our theoretical model is that smaller markets are more
likely to be serviced through intermediaries (∂S
∂L < 0). Our second hypothesis
to be tested reads as follows:
Hypothesis 2 Other things being equal, the lower the average sales volume
of ﬁrms of the home country to a certain export market, the higher the TI
share in the exports to this country.
This hypothesis is consistent with the literature on small business ex-
porting (e.g. OECD (1997)). Fixed costs of exporting prevent small and
medium sized enterprises either from exporting at all or from serving addi-
tional markets in which only a low level of sales can be expected.10 As a ﬁrm
needs an agent in each country, small volumes of transactions lead to agents
being underutilized. Hence, the costs a ﬁrm would incur by putting one of
its own agents into a country with small sales volumes can be prohibitive.
One means of overcoming this restriction is a trade intermediary. Instead of
each ﬁrm paying its own agent, the trade intermediary can exploit economies
of scale from trading and act as an agent for many small and medium-sized
manufacturers in export markets with a low level of sales. In the context of
the following econometrics, hypothesis 2 implies that destination countries
where French producers have a smaller market are more likely to be serviced
through intermediaries.
10See Trabold (1998) for empirical evidence on this point.
11Distance-dependent transaction costs
A third result from our theoretical model is that variable export costs have
no inﬂuence on the TI share (∂S
∂t = 0). Our third hypothesis can therefore
be stated as follows:
Hypothesis 3 Other things being equal, the distance between the home coun-
try and the export market has no inﬂuence on the TI share in the total exports
to this market.
In contrast to the ﬁrst two hypotheses the third does not ﬁnd broadly
support in the literature. Peng and Ilinitch (1998: 614) for instance argue
that manufacturers are more likely to use export intermediaries to enter
distant markets to save on export-related transaction costs. Therefore, the
share of trade intermediaries in total exports should grow with distance. Peng
and Ilinitch’s hypothesis is not supported by our model. We found that a
distance dependent increase in the ﬁxed costs of exporting (e.g. marketing
research and negotiating) would increase the TI share but that a distance
dependent increase in variable transaction costs (e.g. transport costs) has no
inﬂuence on the TI share. It seems reasonable to assume that the variable
cost portion is the main component in the common distance variables, and
that ﬁxed costs to exporting react only weakly to distance.
3 Empirical Evidence
Solid empirical evidence on the activities of trade intermediaries is scarce.
The main reason for this is lack of data which would allow for a time-series or
cross-section analysis. Most empirical work on trade intermediaries is either
based on questionnaires (e.g. Perry, 1992) or case studies (e.g. Becker,
1998; Munro, 1998; Hsing, 1999). Such studies provide valuable insights
on certain aspects of export intermediation, but do not provide a basis for
drawing general conclusions. Our empirical analysis uses a new data set
which has not previously been available for studying such questions. The use
of customs data allows the involvement of trade intermediaries in a countrys’
foreign trade to be analyzed.11
11Trabold (2002) uses this data set for an empirical study on the involvement of trading
ﬁrms in foreign trade. The present study is broader, covering additional types of trade
intermediaries such as wholesale ﬁrms.
123.1 The Data
Our empirical evidence is based on ﬁrm-related data collected by French cus-
toms authorities. Until completion of the European Single Market (at the
end of 1992), customs records of foreign trade transactions were the primary
source for the oﬃcial trade statistics of France. They were compiled from
the export and import declaration forms, which ﬁrms had to provide when
merchandise crossed the border. Among other items, these administrative
documents contain the names and addresses of the ﬁrms owning the merchan-
dise (i.e. exporters or importers), the names and addresses of the carriers,
and a unique number identifying the ﬁrms. This latter information has been
included in the data together with the two-digit code indicating the industry
or service sector to which each exporter and importer belongs, according to
the French classiﬁcation scheme “Nomenclature des Activit´ es et Produits”.
The inclusion of this piece of information allows us to separate ﬁrms into
manufacturers and trade intermediaries.
The data cover approximately 94% of French exports for each of the
years 1985, 1988 and 1990 and encompass approximately 20,000 exporters
(in every year). Each ﬁrm in the data set had annual exports of at least FF
600,000 (approximately US$ 100,000). Between 80,000 (1985) and 95,000
(1990) micro-exporters, accounting for approximately 6% of French exports
in each year, are not included in the data.
Table 1: Export Shares of Intermediary Firms (percent)
1985 1988 1990
Trading ﬁrms 2.6 1.4 1.5
Retail ﬁrms 2.1 1.7 2.4
Wholesale ﬁrms 12.6 14.4 13.3
All trade intermediaries 17.3 17.5 17.2
Notes: In percent of total sample exports, trade weighted averages.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on French Customs Data.
Table 1 shows that French trade intermediaries account for approximately
17% of total French exports in the three years under consideration. Wholesale
ﬁrms handled between 73% (1985) and 82% (1988) of the intermediaries’
exports. Trading ﬁrms and retail ﬁrms share almost equally the remaining
part of the intermediaries’ exports.
The sample used for testing the theoretical propositions contains 161
export markets (countries) for which data are available for at least one of the
three years. Thus our data set includes 465 observations. Table 2 provides
13the descriptive statistics. The variable to be explained by our model is the
share of trade intermediaries in exports to market i in year t (STIti) which
is calculated from the French customs data described above.
We argued above that costs of contract enforcement for non-simultaneous
transactions constitute the major market access barrier. Hence, we use the
civil rights index of the Freedom House as a proxy for market access costs
in export market i.12 The Freedom House Index uses a one-to-seven scale
with one designating those markets granting and enforcing the civil rights
of their citizens to the highest degree. The index includes, among other
information, measures of a functioning system of rule of law. To avoid the
usage of an ordinal variable we transformed the index into a dummy variable
which is zero if the civil rights index is below ﬁve (free) and one if it is above
or equal to ﬁve (unfree).
The market size variable is proxied by the log of average exports of all
French manufacturing ﬁrms to export market i in year t (lnSalesti). Thus in a
sense it represents the underlying demand driven by taste or other factors, in
other words the market potential for French products in a certain destination.
We include the distance between the economic center of the importing
market and Paris as the economic center of France as a proxy for distance-
dependent transaction costs. Distance is computed as great circle dis-
tance and is expressed in logs.
Finally, to capture items such as market structure, competition between
intermediaries, history and common cultural roots, we include the number
of trade intermediaries exporting to a country (TI numberti) and a colonial
dummy (Colonyi) as control variables. TIs are under a constant threat of
being cut out as a middleman by direct interaction between producers and
customers. In order to stay in business in the long run, trade intermediaries
are actively searching for new products and services which they can market
abroad. Controlling for the number of TIs involved in trade to an export
market reﬂects this fact. The higher the number of TIs actively involved
in exports to a country, the higher the share of indirect exports should be.
The colonial dummy (taking the value of 1 if the export market was a for-
mer colony of France and zero otherwise) can capture network eﬀects which
exist between TIs in France and their aﬃliates oversees. This appears to be
justiﬁed as several studies have shown that the formation of networks also
inﬂuences the structure of trade (see for example Rauch, 1999 and Rauch
and Trindade, 2002). Many intermediaries active in contemporary trade
12We also considered the Fraser Institute Index for Economic Freedom. However, this
index is available only for approximately 110 countries and not for the year 1988. In
addition, the correlation between the two indices appears to be quite high.
14between former colonies and their colonial powers have their roots in the
colonial and early post-colonial era. The old links continue to generate cost
advantages over potential competitors who have not yet expended the costs
associated with building relationships. These network eﬀects should lead to
higher shares of indirect trade when exports go to former colonies of France.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std. Dev.
STIti Share of trade intermediaries in French ex- 20.619 15.378
ports to market i in year t. (S in model)
Civil rightsti Dummy which is 0 if market i ensures civil 0.503
rights in year t, otherwise 1. (g in model)
LnSalesti log average exports of French manufacturers 15.124 0.739
to market i in year t. (L in model)
LnDistancei log great circle distance (km) from Paris to 8.457 0.846
economic center of market i. (t in model)
TI numberti Number of trade intermediaries in French ex- 129.366 329.098
ports to market i in year t. (control)
Colonyi Dummy which is 1 if market i is a former 0.194 0.396
colony of France, otherwise 0. (control)
Notes: t = 1985, 1988 and 1990; i = 161 importing markets; N = 465.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on French Customs Data.
Table 2 shows that the (unweighted) mean share of TIs in French exports
is 20.6%, which is higher than the trade-weighted average of all markets
reported in Table 1. The share of TIs is highest in exports to Somalia (97%
in 1988), Papua New Guinea (96% in 1990), and Capverde Islands (81% in
1988). Exports to Zimbabwe (0.35% in 1985), Costa Rica (0.44% in 1988),
and Fiji Islands (0.48% in 1988) show the lowest share of TIs. The lnSalesti
variable indicates that the average exports of manufacturing ﬁrms to the
diﬀerent export markets ranges from 12.94 (FF 0.417 million) to Somalia in
1988 to 18.225 (FF 82.23 million) to Liberia in 1990.
3.2 Estimation Results
To test our hypotheses on trade intermediation developed in Section 2.2 we
estimated a pooled OLS Regression with the above mentioned variables over
three years (1985, 1988, 1990). The result is presented in Table 3. All vari-
ables have the expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant on a one percent
error level. We excluded from our regression several other variables because
15of their insigniﬁcance. These variables are: year dummies to account for
structural diﬀerences among the three years and the absolute trade volume.
Omitting these variables did not change the results with regard to the eﬀects
of the other variables. We also estimated regressions for each of the years
and one regression based on a three-year average for the variables. Again,
the results remained virtually unaﬀected.














R2 0.240 (not adj.)
No. obs. 465
F-Test 39.55 [F(5,459)]
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. ∗∗ parameters are signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on French Customs Data.
Importing markets with a low level of enforcement of civil rights (variable
Civil rightsti), i.e. high market access costs, show a signiﬁcantly higher share
of trade intermediaries than markets with a high level of enforcement of civil
rights. In other words, once the market-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs to exporting
increase, more ﬁrms will choose to go through intermediaries. This ﬁnding
supports our ﬁrst hypothesis that trade intermediaries serve as a mechanism
to deal with market access costs, e.g. to generate self-enforcing transactions
when contract and property rights are poorly enforced.
The inﬂuence of the log average exports of French manufacturers is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant (variable lnSalesti). This is in line with our second
hypothesis that trade intermediaries can exploit market size eﬀects from trad-
ing and pool industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs more easily when average exports
16of manufacturers are low. Thus, smaller markets will be serviced dispropor-
tionately more through intermediaries, while larger markets will see more
direct exporters.
The inﬂuence of the log of distance (LnDistancei) is insigniﬁcant, just
as predicted by the model. Namely, variable distance-dependent transaction
costs (say transport costs) have no inﬂuence on the share of intermediaries in
exports of a country to a certain destination. Hence, our third hypothesis –
that distance-dependent transaction costs are irrelevant for explaining trade
intermediation – is supported.
Also both control variables show intuitively compelling signs. The vari-
able TInumberti shows that when the number of intermediaries rises, the
share of intermediated exports also rises. The estimated coeﬃcient for the
colonial dummy variable (Colonyi) is signiﬁcant and positive. This ﬁnding
points to the importance of history and network eﬀects as determinants of
trade intermediation.
Turning to the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀects, we want to highlight
only a few of the most interesting eﬀects. We ﬁnd that civil rights are an
important factor in the explanation of trade intermediation. If a country
develops from a low to a high level of civil rights, the fraction of exports
handled by intermediaries falls by almost 9 percentage points. An increase
in market size, or more precisely an increase in the average log sales of the
manufacturing ﬁrms to a given country by one per cent (from 3.7 to 4.3
million FF taken the antilog) lowers the share of intermediated exports by
almost 8 percentage points.
4 Conclusion
One of the striking discrepancies between the theory and the reality of in-
ternational trade concerns trade intermediaries. The present paper can be a
start towards addressing this theoretical and empirical gap. Here, we have
explored some of the key factors explaining why trade intermediaries are em-
ployed intensively in exports to some countries, but not to others. First, we
developed a simple two-country monopolistic competition model of interna-
tional trade. By distinguishing explicitly between variable and ﬁxed costs to
trade, it was possible to introduce a trade intermediary that can pool ﬁxed
export costs into the model. From the theoretical framework, we developed a
number of hypotheses to be tested. Second, using a unique set of enterprise-
related customs data from France, we examined the TI share to diﬀerent
destination markets. This data was applied to test for key factors thought to
be decisive for answering the question why the TI share in exports diﬀers for
17diﬀerent markets. Based on the model and the estimates, we hope to have
shown, at least to a certain degree, that the following three factors matter
for the extent of trade intermediation in diﬀerent markets: First, the more
diﬃcult and costly market access to a certain export market is, the more
buyers and sellers will rely on trade intermediaries as a means of tackling
these costs. Second, the higher the relevant market size of the destination
country is, the lower the share of intermediated exports. Third, the distance
to the export market, as long as it inﬂuences variable costs (transport costs),
has no eﬀect on the share of exports going through intermediaries.
The task for future research on this topic will be, ﬁrst, to overcome the
weak data situation surrounding trade intermediation in general, and second,
to analyze the importance of the commodity structure of exports, e.g. the
degree of product diﬀerentiation. In doing so, further predictions based on
our model and on the insights of Rauch (1999) – who ﬁnds that geographic
and cultural proximity are more important for diﬀerentiated products than
for homogenous products – could be tested. Finally, future research must
address how risks associated with exchange rate ﬂuctuations and ﬁnancial
instability aﬀect the degree of trade intermediation.
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